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to test their strength against Maccomb's militia levies. In the naval battle, with no striking disparity between the forces engaged, the Americans won a sweeping victory. Through excess of caution which appears extraordinary in view of all the circumstances, Prevost thereupon gave over the campaign and retired with all practicable speed to Canada. That there was no real battle between the land forces is plainly evident from the casualties in the two armies. The loss of the British during the eight-day period ending September 14 was but 37 killed and 150 wounded. The American loss was likewise 37 killed, and 62 wounded. The outcome of the campaign was a disgrace to British annals; but the American militia were an almost negligible factor in the premises. The American soldier may well pray to be spared such apologists as the author of this book.

*Invasion of the city of Washington.* A disagreeable study in and of military unpreparedness. By John M. Stahl (Chicago: Van Trump company, 1918. 257 p. \$1.00)

This book is an historical sermon under fifteen heads on the necessity of military and naval preparedness. The author has sought diligently through the scriptures of American history for texts and, in pursuing his narrative through 1814, has a good old-fashioned moral for the nation of today. Like most sermons the composition is rambling and subjective. The author zealously tries to do his bit to "make the world safe for democracy." Yet in view of the fact that the history of the war of 1812 is just now being rewritten under the auspices of the National security league, with the idea that the United States failed to see the real enemy and took the wrong side in that great war, is it not as well that the preparedness idea was not carried out efficiently in the pre-war period? After all can such a volume with its sweeping deductions make a serious claim to being "history"?

A. C. C.

*Romance of old Philadelphia.* By John T. Faris. (New York: J. B. Lippincott company, 1918. 336 p. \$4.50 net)

Could the pioneer of early times have known how conspicuously he was to figure in the many compilations of the future, he would have been greatly perturbed and perchance written differently the early history of our country — not better perhaps but more conscientiously — probably in some respects less interestingly and picturesquely. At least he would have left more complete records of his doings.

The pioneers of Philadelphia may have guessed the importance their records were destined to have in later days; at any rate they left a generous storehouse.